

b. $(\forall x)(\exists y)A_1^2(y, x)$

$(\forall x)(\forall y)(A_1^2(x, y) \Rightarrow \neg A_1^2(z, y))$

$(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)(A_1^2(x, y) \wedge A_1^2(y, z) \Rightarrow A_1^2(x, z))$

2.22 Determine whether the following wfs are logically valid

a. $\neg (\exists y)(\forall x)(A_1^2(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \neg A_1^2(x, x))$

b. $[(\exists x)A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow (\exists x)A_2^1(x)] \Rightarrow (\exists x)(A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow A_2^1(x))$

c. $(\exists x)(A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow (\forall y)A_1^1(y))$

d. $(\forall x)(A_1^1(x) \vee A_2^1(x)) \Rightarrow ((\forall x)A_1^1(x) \vee (\exists x)A_2^1(x))$

e. $(\exists x)(\exists y)(A_1^2(x, y) \Rightarrow (\forall z)A_1^2(z, y))$

f. $(\exists x)(\exists y)(A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow A_2^1(y)) \Rightarrow (\exists x)(A_1^1(x) = A_2^1(x))$

g. $(\forall x)(A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow A_2^1(x)) \Rightarrow \neg (\forall x)(A_1^1(x) \Rightarrow \neg A_2^1(x))$

2.23 Exhibit a logically valid wf that is not an instance of a tautology. However, show that any logically valid open wf (that is, a wf without quantifiers) must be an instance of a tautology.

2.24 a. Find a satisfiable closed wf that is not true in any interpretation whose domain has only one member.

b. Find a satisfiable closed wf that is not true in any interpretation whose domain has fewer than three members.

3. First-order Theories

In the case of the propositional calculus, the method of truth tables provides an effective test as to whether any given statement form is a tautology. However, there does not seem to be any effective process for determining whether given wf is logically valid, since, in general, one has to check the truth of a wf for interpretations with arbitrarily large finite or infinite domains. In fact, we shall see later that, according to a plausible definition of "effective", it may actually be proved that there is no effective way to test for logical validity. The axiomatic method, which was a luxury in the

study of the propositional calculus, thus appears to be a ~~necessity~~ necessity in the study of wfs involving quantifiers and we therefore turn now to the consideration of first order theories.

3.1.1 ~~Logical Axioms~~ Let \mathcal{L} be a first order language. A first order theory ~~of \mathcal{L} is a formal theory K whose symbols and wfs are the symbols and wfs of \mathcal{L} , whose axioms and rules of inference are specified in the following way. (You must review the axiomatic system of propositional calculus. We shall use the terminology (proof, theorem, consequence, axiomatic, $\vdash B$ etc.) and notation ($\Gamma \vdash B$, $\vdash B$ introduced there.)~~

the axioms of K are divided into two classes, the logical axioms and the proper (or nonlogical) axioms.

3.1.1 Logical Axioms

If B, C and D are wfs of \mathcal{L} , the following are logical axioms of K :

$$(A1) B \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow B)$$

$$(A2) (B \Rightarrow (C \Rightarrow D)) \Rightarrow ((B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow D))$$

$$(A3) (\neg C \Rightarrow \neg B) \Rightarrow ((\neg C \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow C)$$

(A4) $(\forall x_i) B(x_i) \Rightarrow B(t)$ if $B(x_i)$ is a wf of \mathcal{L} and t is a term of \mathcal{L} that is free for x_i in $B(x_i)$. Note here that t may be identical with x_i so that all wfs $(\forall x_i) B \Rightarrow B$ are axioms by virtue of axiom (A4).

(A5) $(\forall x_i) (B \Rightarrow C) \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow (\forall x_i) C)$ if B contains no ^{free} occurrences of x_i .

3.1.2 Proper axioms

These cannot be specified, since they vary from theory to theory. A first order theory in which there are no proper axioms is called a first order predicate calculus.

3.1.3 Rules of Inference

The rules of inference of any first order theory are:

1. Modus ponens : C follows from B and $B \Rightarrow C$.
2. Generalization : $(\forall x_i)B$ follows from B .

We shall use the abbreviations MP and Gen, to indicate applications of these rules.

Definition Let K be a first order theory in the language L . By a model of K we mean an interpretation of L for which all the axioms of K are true.

By (III) and (VI) of Page-54 and Page-55, if the rules of modus ponens and generalization are applied to wfs that are true for a given interpretation, then the results of these applications are also true. Hence every theorem of K is true in every model of K .

As we shall see, the logical axioms are so designed that the logical consequences (in the sense defined on pages 60-61) of the closures of the axioms of K are precisely the theorems of K . In particular, if K is a first order predicate calculus, it turns out that the theorems of K are just those wfs of K that are logically valid.

Examples of first order theories

1. Partial order. Let the language L have a single predicate letter A_2^2 and no function letters and individual constants. We shall write $x_i < x_j$ instead of $A_2^2(x_i, x_j)$. The theory K has two proper axioms.

- a. $(\forall x_1) (\neg x_1 < x_1)$ (irreflexivity)
- b. $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall x_3) (x_1 < x_2 \wedge x_2 < x_3 \Rightarrow x_1 < x_3)$ (transitivity)

A model of the theory is called a partially ordered structure

2. Group theory. Let the language L have one predicate letter A_1^2 , one function letter f_1^2 , and one individual constant a_1 . To conform with ordinary notation, we shall write $x = y$ instead of $A_1^2(x, y)$,

$+s$ instead of $f_1^2(t, s)$ and 0 instead of a_1 . The proper axioms of K are:

- $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall x_3)(x_1 + (x_2 + x_3)) = (x_1 + x_2) + x_3$ (associativity)
- $(\forall x_1)(0 + x_1 = x_1)$ (identity)
- $(\forall x_1)(\exists x_2)(x_2 + x_1 = 0)$ (inverse)
- $(\forall x_1)(x_1 = x_1)$ (reflexivity of $=$)
- $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(x_1 = x_2 \Rightarrow x_2 = x_1)$ (symmetry of $=$)
- $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall x_3)(x_1 = x_2 \wedge x_2 = x_3 \Rightarrow x_1 = x_3)$ (transitivity of $=$)
- $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(\forall x_3)(x_2 = x_3 \Rightarrow x_1 + x_2 = x_1 + x_3$
 $\wedge x_2 + x_1 = x_3 + x_1)$ (substitutivity of $=$)

A model for this theory, in which the interpretation of $=$ is the identity relation, is called a group. A group is said to be abelian if, in addition, the wf $(\forall x_1)(\forall x_2)(x_1 + x_2 = x_2 + x_1)$ is true.

Properties of First order theories

All the results in this section refer to an arbitrary first order theory K .

Instead of writing $\vdash_K B$, we shall simply write $\vdash B$

Proposition 3.2 Every wf B of K that is an instance of a tautology is a theorem of K , and it may be proved using only axioms (A1)-(A3) and MP.

Proof: B arises from a tautology \mathcal{J} by substitution. By proposition 1.9 (p. 38), there is a proof of \mathcal{J} in L . In such a proof, make the same substitution of wfs of K for statement letters as were used in obtaining B from \mathcal{J} , and, for all statement letters in the proof that do not occur in \mathcal{J} , substitute an wf of K . Then the resulting sequence of wfs is a proof of B , and this proof uses only axiom schemes (A1)-(A3) and MP.

The application of proposition 3.2 in a proof will be indicated by writing "Tautology."

Proposition 3.3 Every theorem of a first order predicate calculus is logically valid.

Proof: Axioms (A1)-(A3) are logically valid by property (VII) of the notion of truth (see page 55), and axioms (A4) and (A5) are logically valid by properties (X) and (XI) (see page 57-58). By properties (III) and (VI), the rules of inference MP and Gen preserve logical validity (see page 54-55). Hence every theorem of a predicate calculus is logically valid.

Example The wf $(\forall x_2)(\exists x_1) A_1^2(x_1, x_2) \Rightarrow (\exists x_1)(\forall x_2) A_1^2(x_1, x_2)$ is not a theorem of any first order predicate calculus, since it is not logically valid (Example 5, Ex-61)

Definition A theory K is consistent if no wf B and its negation $\neg B$ are both provable in K . A theory is inconsistent if it is not consistent.

Corollary 3.4 Any first order predicate calculus is consistent

Proof: If a wf B and its negation $\neg B$ were both theorems of a first order predicate calculus, then by proposition 3.3, both B and $\neg B$ would be logically valid, which is impossible.

Notice that, in an inconsistent theory K , every wf C of K is provable in K . In fact, assume that B and $\neg B$ are both provable in K . Since the wf $B \Rightarrow (\neg B \Rightarrow C)$ is an instance of a tautology, that wf is, by proposition 3.2, is provable in K . Then two applications of MP would yield $\vdash C$.

It follows from this remark that, if some wf of a theory K is not a theorem of K , then K is consistent.

The deduction theorem (proposition 1.7, page-31) for the propositional calculus can not be carried over without modification to first order theories. For example, for any wf B , $B \vdash_K (\forall x_i) B$, but it is not always the case that $\vdash_K B \Rightarrow (\forall x_i) B$.

Consider a domain containing at least two elements c and d . Let K be a predicate calculus and let B be $A_1^1(x_1)$. Interpret A_1^1 as a property that holds only for c . Then $A_1^1(x_1)$ is satisfied by any sequence $s = (s_1, s_2, \dots)$ in which $s_1 = c$,